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In the Suprem.e Court
of the State of Utah
GREAT AMERICAN INDEJ\IfNITY COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff ood Appellant,
vs.
W. S. BERRYESSA and FRANK BERRYESSA,
Defendants and Respondents.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This being an action at law in which a jury in the
lower court has rendered its verdict, if there is any substantial evidence to support the verdict this court will
not interfere, even though in its judgment, if it were to
pass on the facts, the verdict would have been otherwise,
or is, in its opinion against the weight of the evidence.
As this court has succinctly stated in the case of Harris
v. Ogden Steam Laundry Company 39 Utah 436, 117 P.
700, and has in substance reiterated many times:
"We cannot interfere in cases that are doubtful with regard to the facts any more than we
can in cases that are clear upon the facts. The
test is as to whether there is any substantial
evidence upon every material issue which must
be established in order to authorize a recovery.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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If there is, we, like the losing party in the case,
must submit to the verdict, although like he, we
might think it should have been the other way.''
We accordingly restate the facts in accordance with
the evidence most favorable to the defendant, as it was
the prerogative of the jury to believe such evidence,
rather than possibly conflicting evidence offered by
plaintiff.
Respondent, W. S. Berryessa, is the father of Frank
Berryessa. Frank was an office employee of the Ben
Lomond Hotel in Ogden. Plaintiff had issued a surety
bond guaranteeing the integrity of Frank. In the fore~
part of January, 1950, the hotel discovered a shortage
in Frank's accounts. Frank notified his father and
W. S. Berryessa went to the hotel and met with I. F.
Keller, the hotel auditor. It was then assumed that the
shortage was in the cash account only, and amounted to
$2,186.00. So far there is no dispute as to the facts.
At this point, however, plaintiff in his statement of
facts says:
''The defendant stated that he was prepared
to make good any and all losses and was very
insistent on keeping the matter quiet and notreporting it to the bonding company * * *. Defendant insisted on signing a note to the Hotel Company for the amount of the assumed shortage,
aggregating $2,000.00. ''
We call the court's attention, however, to the defendant's precise testimony in regard to this matter:

Q. (By Mr. Young) And didn't you at that
time say to Mr. Keller in substance and effect,
2
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''I don't want you to even tell the bonding company about this shortage''?
A. No, I didn't.
Q. And didn't you say, "If you won't tell
the bonding company about this matter, I'll pay
every cent of that shortage"?

A. No, sir.
Q. Either in substance or effect?

A. No, sir.
(Tr. 32-33).
A little later ~Ir. Berryessa went to the office of
:Jfr. Campbell Eccles, manager of the Hotel, and there
signed a note payable to the Hotel in the principal
amount of Two Thousand One Hundred Eighty-six
($2,186.00) Dollars, which was the then assumed amount
of the shortage. The circumstances surrounding the
signing of this note, as testified to by defendant under
cross-examination, are as follows:
A. I signed the note with the understanding
that was the full amount that was short and that
the bonding company wouldn't be notified. Mr.
Eccles told me the bonding company wouldn't be
notified. I could straighten up that shortage and
Frank would be able to work out and pay that
back. That was the understanding I had. He
said that it would he kept quiet. It wouldn't be
advertised, and that was the reason I signed that
note.

Q. Yes. In other words, you at that time
asked Mr. Eccles not to notify the bonding company of this shortage.
3
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A. I didn't ask him. He offered that.
( Tr. 34-35).
Later the hotel auditor determined from an examination of the ledger accounts that the amount of the
shortage totaled in excess of $6,000, and at that time
Mr. Berryessa again met with Mr. Keller, the hotel
auditor, and Mr. Eccles, the hotel manager. In this
connection plaintiff in its statements of facts makes
the following observation as being the fact:
''However, defendant insisted that whatever the
amount, he was prepared to make it good".
We again call the court's attention to the testimony of
Mr. Berryessa with regard to that matter.

Q. And didn't you then say in substance and
effect, I don't want any publicity given to this
matter. I'll pay every cent of it.

A. No sir; I didn't say that. That is impossible. I knew I couldn't pay that.
Q. You didn't make a statement either to
that effect either to Mr. Eccles or Mr. Keller.
A. It was never brought up for me to pay
that amount.

(Tr. 35).
Mr. Eccles thereupon advised Mr. Berryessa that
in view of the large amount of the shortage it. would be
neeessary that the bonding company be notified, whioh
he did through the bonding company's representative
Mr. Hagman. Subsequent meetings with Mr. Hagman
were held, at one of which, namely, March 3, 1950, Mr.
Hagman received from Frank Berryessa a written state--

4
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ment acknowledging his misappropriation of a total of
Six Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty-five and 28j100
($6,865.28) Dollars (Defendant's Exhibit 1).
Later Frank requested his father to accompany him
to a meeting with l\Ir. Hagman in Mr. Hagman's office
in Salt Lake City, and at that time Mr. Hagman and
Frank discussed the signing of a note, which note would
bear not only Frank's signature, but that of hi's father,
:Mr. Berryessa, and his brother-in-law, Roy Patterson.
l\Ir. Hagman prepared such a note which called for quarterly payments of Two Hundred Fifty ($250.00) Dollars.
Frank took the note with him and mailed it to his brother-in-law Roy Patterson in New Mexico, but Patterson returned the note unsigned. (Tr. 18-19). Thereafter and early in June, apparently on June 4, 1950,
Frank and his- father, this defendant, again went to Mr.
Hagman's office in Salt Lake City, at which time Frank
advised Mr. Hagman that Patterson had sent the note
back unsigned. Mr. Hagman wanted Mr. Berryessa
to sign the note, but Mr. Berryessa refused. The defendant then testified {Tr. 21) that upon Mr. Berryessa 's refusal to sign the note ''Mr. Hagman got angry
and swore, and pounded his desk with his fist, and said
'You can't come here and tell me what you will do' ".
Mr. Berryessa thereupon told Mr. Hagman that it was
impossible for them to meet quarterly payments of
$250, and in response to a question propounded by Mr.
Hagman stated that payments of $50 a month could be
made. Mr. Hagman then told Mr. Berryessa that at
$50 a month it would take forever to pay off the full
amount of the shortage, but that if Mr. Berryessa would
pay $2,000 in cash and thereby reduce the amount to
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$4,865.20, a note co-signed by Mr. Berryessa in that
amount and payable in $50 monthly installments would
be accepted. Mr. Berryessa thereupon agreed to pay
$2,000, and co-sign with Frank upon the note in the
amount of $4,865.20, which is the note here sued upon.
Further in regard to his agreement to sign this note and
make the $2,000 cash payment, Mr. Berryessa testified
(Tr. 21) as follows:
''Mr. Hagman told me if we would sign the
note and I would make that payment that he
wouldn't prosecute Frank, but if I didn't he
would have to prosecute him.''
(Tr. 21-22).
Apparently on the next day, June 5, 1950, Mr. Hagman caused the note to be prepared and forwarded the
same to Mr. Berryessa in Ogden, and Mr. Berryessa
signed the note on June 6 and returned it to Mr. Hagman. He did not have the $2,000, but took immediate
steps to raise the same by borrowing upon some property he had. Because of other expenses he succeeded
in having but $1,500 of the $2,000 he had agreed to pay.
He got a cashier's check in the amount of $1,500, which
he delivered to Mr. Hagman on or about July 3, 1950.
(Defendant's Exhibit 2), at that time explaining why
he was $500 short. To make up this shortage he delivered to Mr. Hagman his personal check in the amount
of $500, but asked Mr. Hagman to delay presenting it
for payment for a reasonable time to permit him to raise
the money to cover it, and Mr. Hagman agreed to this
arrangement. The $500 check was never presented for
payment and was in possession of defendant at the time
the action was brought. (Defendant's Exhibit 3). Sub-
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sequently, :Mr. Berryessa saw 1\Ir. Hagman on two or
three occasions primarily in connection with payments
upon the note between the time that the note was signed
in June, 1950, and the bringing of this action in December, 1950. FiYe $50 payments were made thereon, one
by ~Ir. Berryessa out of his own funds, and the other
four payments out of funds received by him from
Frank's wife. These five payments constituted the installment payments due for July, August, September,
October and November. The installment payment due
on December 1st was not made, and in December plaintiff purportedly elected to mature the entire principal,
because of such default, and brought this action for the
full amount of such note, less the payments that had
been made thereon.
Defendant defended upon the ground that the note
was void as his signature thereon was obtained by duress, and that the note was not supported by any lawful
consideration. He counter-claimed against the plaintiff for the return of the $1,500 he had paid, and the
return of his $500 check, and upon the jury's verdict in
his favor judgment was entered by the court in favor
of the defendant upon the note and for the return by
plaintiff to defendant of the $1,500 paid and the $500
check.
As further bearing upon the circumstances under
which the note was signed, the $500 check delivered,
and the $1,500 paid, Mr. Berryessa testified that he
would not have signed the note but for the statements
and threats made by Mr. Hagman as to what would
happen to Frank if he did not do so, nor would he have
paid the $1,500 or given his $500 check but for such
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per,son for a felony, or under threats of arrest or
prosecution, would be void as against public
policy.''
And generally, 10 C.J.S., Bills and Notes, Page 630:
"Bills and notes for the concealment of a
crime or the suppression or hindering of a criminal prosecution are against public policy and cannot be enforced between the immediate parties,
whether the maker was innocent or guilty. If
an agreement not to prosecute criminally forms
any part of the consideration, it is immaterial
that there was an existing indebtedness which
could have been a consideration for the instrument, as where the bill or note was given for
money embezzled or stolen by the maker.''
Plaintiff's particular point here is that the court
erred in permitting the defendant to testify that he
would not have signed the note or paid the money but
for plaintiff's threats and promises, because it called
for a conclusion of the witness.
As the court well recognizes, the line of demarcation between a fact and a conclusion is often difficult
of discernment, and, in the last analysis, every statement of fact is to some extent founded on inference or
induction. As stated in 32 C.J.S., Evidence, Page 101,
''Much effort is expended during the trial
of causes to confine the testimony of witnesses
to statements of what they saw, heard, or otherwise observed, as distinguished from the inferences or opinions formed as a result of such observations. The distinction is, however, one which
it is in many cases impossible to draw for the
reason that the most simple statement of fact
involves -an element of coordination induction

10
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or inference, the fact and the inference being
frequently so blended that they cannot be separated. The modern tendency is to regard it as
more important to get the truth of the matter
than to quibble over distinctions which are in
many cases impracticable, and a witness is permitted to state a fact known to or observed by
him even though his statement involves a certain
element of inference.''
And again in 20 Am. J ur., Evidence, Page 643 :
''The general rule excluding opinions of witnesses is simple in statement, but not so simple
in application, for it is not always easy to distinguish in the testimony of a witness facts within
his knowledge or observation from his opinions
on facts. As a general rule, a witness may testify
directly to a composite fact, although in a sense
his testimony may include his conclusions from
other facts. In the multitudinous affairs of
everyday life, it is extremely difficult to distinguish between 'opinion' on the· one hand and
'fact' or 'knowledge' on the other. Moreover,
objections that proposed testimony states a conclusion only are sometimes pushed to captious
extremes. The true solution seems to he that
such questions are left for the practical discretion
of the trial court.''
Direct application of the foregoing rules to situations similar to the present are to be found in the
cases of Ballard v. Burton (Vt.) 24 .A. 769, wherein
the court held it proper for a witness to testify what
he would or would not have done, but for another's promise; and Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Mit.chell,
(Tex.) 44 8. W. 274, wherein it was held proper for
a witness to testify what he would have done had a
telegram been delivered to him.
11
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More directly in point from a factual standpoint
is the case of Daum v. Urquart, (8. D.) 249 N. W. 738,
which involved an action for the recovery of money
allegedly obtained by duress. In this case the plaintiff,
while testifying as a witness, was asked if he ''would
have voluntarily given to the defendant U rquart the
sum of $7,000 if it had not been for the duress, coercion
and threats that were given to you there in that office" .
. The question was objected to on the ground that it invaded the province of the jury. The objection was overruled, and the plaintiff said he would not have done so.
Error was predicated upon this ruling. The court held
as follows.:
"It is the theory of the defense that plaintiff admited that he had taken considerable· sums
of defendant's money and that he desired to make
restitution, and that it was this desire on his
part that prompted him to pay the $7,000. It
was for the purpose of showing what really
prompted him to pay the money that this question was asked. In Clark v. Mosier, 35 S. D. 54,
150 N. W. 475, we held that this question calls
for neither a conclusion nor a self-serving declaration, but for a statement of fact. It was for
the purpose of showing the inducement that
prompted plaintiff to pay the money. It was
not binding on the jury and did not prejudice the
defendant. The jury was free to draw its own
conclusions as to whether he paid the money because his will had been overcome by Crawford
and Carter or whether he was prompted by the
desire to pay an honest debt.''
And Clark v. Mosier (8. D.) 150 N. W. 475:

12
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"While on the witness stand, plaintiff was
asked whether or not he would have released
the cattle if defendant had not agreed to pay the
damage. This was objected to on the ground
that it calls for a conclusion and a self-serving
declaration of the witness. The objection was
overruled, and rightly so. The question is not
objectionable on either of these grounds. It calls
for neither a conclusion nor a self-serving declaration, but for a statement of fact. That plaintiff released the cattle and thereby surrendered
his lien thereon was an admitted fact; and the
purpose of the question was to show the inducement that prompted plaintiff to forego such
security and to show that he acted solely on defendant's promise to pay.''
In the case of St. Pool Mercury Indemnity Co. v.
Guntzburger, (Minn.) 271 N. W. 478, in which the trial
court found duress, and the Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed, the following was not found improper:
"And he (Hawkland) handed me the note
and I refused to sign, and finally says I, 'Now,
what you going to do if I don't sign that note~'
'Well,' he says, 'we will turn him over to the
bonding company, and you know what that
means.' Says I, 'Yes, I think that means State's
prison.' And he said 'Yes.' Well, my grandson
sat right there and (I) looked in his eyes. I
could see him. He faced me. Mr. Hawkland was
sitting right about this way from me. And I see
the tears was running down his (Lowell's) cheeks,
and that is what got me, and I signed it. I didn't
want my name dragged in that I have a grandson
in the State's prison.

13
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'Q. And you had been talking about this
matter, as you say, all through the evening, the
couple hours that he was there? A. Yes, more or
less.
'Q. Now, if this had not been said to you,
would you have signed that note otherwise, Mr.
Guntzburger? • • • A. I don't think I would.
'Q. Is that why you signed the note 1 A.
That is why I signed the note. ·
'Q. And did you believe that if you did not
sign it your grandson would be turned over to
the bonding company and prosecuted and sent to
prison 1 A. I sure did believe it, that is what
they would do, and I was thinking of the two
children he has got and his wife. • • •' ".
We submit, accordingly, that there was no error in
the reception of this testimony.
POINT II
Plaintiff's second point of argument is that the
trial court erred in refusing to receive in evidence its
proffered Exhibit I, although plaintiff's argument is
limited substantially to the- bare statement that such
ruling constituted error. We will pursue the matter
somewhat further.
It is not, and was not, defendant's contention that
any duress or coercion entered into the relation of the
parties to the matter then under investigation prior to
the meeting in Mr. Hagman's office in early June, 1950,
and the issues were so framed. The stage was set, however, long prior to that; for it will be recalled that in
early March plaintiff's agent, Mr. Hagman, obtained

14
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from Frank Berryessa his signed admission of guilt in
the misappropriation of the hotel's funds. With that
in his possession Mr. Hagman was in a position to crack
the whip as and when, in his opinion, circumstances
dictated.
He did not do so immediately. The first proposal
was that the plaintiff company be reimbursed hy way
of a note to be signed by Frank and co-signed by W. S.
Berryessa and his son-in-law, Roy Patterson. This
proposal came from Mr. Hagman at the meeting in his
office among himself, Mr. Berryessa and Frank on
April 19th. (Hagman testimony, Tr. 89). Mr. Berryessa likewise testified as to this and to the effect that
at the time this Patterson note was discussed Mr. Hagman didn't even inquire if Mr. Berryessa would sign it,
but was concerned only as to whether Patterson would
sign. (Tr. 39-40). Mr. Hagman did not deny this, and
the inference is clear that Mr. Hagman, then having
Frank's signed admission of guilt, knew he could bend
Mr. Berryessa to his will at pleasure, hut Patterson,
being out of the state and in the family only by marriage,
was a different matter.
The upshot of it was, of course, that Patterson
didn't sign the note, and Mr. Hagman was so informed
at the meeting in early June, on which occasion Mr.
Berryessa told Mr. Hagman that he wouldn't sign it
either. Here it was that Mr. Hagman found it expedient
for the first time to display the iron glove Frank's signed
confession of guilt had clothed him with. In Mr. Be·rryessa 's words, he pounded the table with his fist and
swore, and said ''You can't come here and tell me what
you will do". And then, having made his position of

15
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dominance clear, he mellowed a little, and was· willing
to discuss somewhat milder terms of payment and a
different note, but in connection therewith made it clear
t.o Mr. Berryessa that if he didn't sign the new note,
and make the other payments discussed, Frank would
be criminally prosecuted, but if he did, no prosecution
would follow. (Tr. 21-54).
Now, it's against this background that the lette;r
Exhibit I was offered and refused. This exhibit is a
letter from Mr. BerryesBa to 1\tir~ Hagman dated May
22, 1950, and relating to the then. pending_ :Patterson
note. It. was prior to the time that the exeraise· of any
dureSB is claimed, and related to. a transaction. that is
not the· subject of this litigation, and, as a matter of
fact, was never consummated.
The only question here involved was whet-Her the
note of June 6th, which is the subject of this-litigation,
and whether the payments subsequently made, which
came out of the June 6th meeting, resulted from duress.
It was not, accordingly, prejudicial error for the lowel'
court to exclude evidence tending to show that no duress
was exercised in connection with the propos-ed Patterson
note, because no dureSB in connection, ther-ewith is
claimed.
It is interesting to note, too, that plaintiff'·s- counsel,
in connection with his discussion- with the court as to
the admissability of Exhibi~t I, was laboring· under the
mistaken impression that the pleadings claime<f duTess
prior to the early June meeting, but after examining
the pleadings and satisfying himself of his error in that
rega.rd, he pursued it no further by argum-ent, lJut sub;.
mitted it to th~ court. ( Tr. 56-57).
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POINT IIL
Plaintiff's third point is directed toward the- contention that at the conclusion of defendant's evidence
defendant's defense of duress and lack of consid~ration
had not been sustained by the evidence.
At this point, of course, only defendant's evidence
as to duress and lack of consideration was in, such being
affirmatiYe defenses as to which defendant had the
burden. The evidence was uncontradicted, but whether
it is taken in its uncontradicted state, or in the light of
conflicts arising through the later testimony of plaintiff's witnesses, there was at all times a case for the jury.
Defendant testified in substance that plaintiff's
agent told liim' that if he didn't sign the note his son
Frank would be criminally prosecuted and sent to the
penitentiary. Bearing in mind that Mr. Hagman then
had in his possession Frank's signed confession of guilt,
and, Mr. Berryessa knew he had it, it is apparent that
1\Ir. Hagman had the power to enforce his threats, and
Mr. Berryessa had reason to believe such threats would
be carried out. This factual situation if true-, and it
was for the jury to find the truth, established duress
sufficient to invalidate the note under all the decisions.
We refer again to this court's decision in Payson Building & Loan Society v. Taylor, supra :
"The statements made to the defendants that
Lee R. Taylor would be arrested and imprisoned
with the consequent disgrace and humiliation that
would result from such threatened arrest and
imprisonment was sufficient to put the husband
and wife in fear and to cause them to act contrary to their respective wills and inclinations.
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Such being the allegations and the proof, ~ case
of duress is made out sufficient to avoid the
validity of the' executed instruments.''
We have, of course, no quarrel with .the cases of
Ellison v. Pingree, 64 Utah 468, 231 P. 826, or Fox v.
Piercey, _: _____ ~ ____ Utah ____________ , 227 P. (2) 763, upon which
plaintiff states it relies principally. In the Pingree case
this court upheld a lower court finding of no duress,
but Pingree himself had testified that he did not enter
into the c.ontracts because of any threats. This court
there observed :
''In our judgment the district court was
clearly right in holding that under Mr. Pingree's
own statements he utterly failed to establish duress as that term is understood and applied by
the courts. In his testimony he asserted over and
over again that, stating it in his own language,
'it wasn't fear of him (Poppenhusen) sending
me to the penitentiary' that induced him to enter
into the contracts or either of them, and that
he was 'not scared' of Mr. Poppenhusen. This
statement is made so often, and in so many ways,
that there is absolutely no room for doubt that
it was not fear of imprisonment or loss of liberty,
or of any personal injury, violence, or harm that
induced Mr. Pingree to sign the contracts.''
In Fox v. Piercy this court adhered to what it referred to as the modern rule, as follows:
"It must appear that the threat or act is of
such a nature and made under such circumstances
as to constitute a reasonable and adequate cause
to control the will of the threatened person.''
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The facts of the instant case meet this test.
Now as to the defense of lack of consideration. For
immediate purposes, that is, for the question of plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict, if the defense of
duress was good the motion was properly denied irrespective of the defense of lack of consideration. We
submit, however, that the defense of lack of consideration likewise was established.
Plaintiff's position is stated to be (Page 20 of
Brief) that the extension of additional time to Frank
in which to make the payment in and of itself constituted sufficient consideration for defendant's signing
the note. We submit that this is not true when, as here
testified to by the defendant, there is present the promise tha.t if the note is signed Frank would not be crVminally prosecuted.
We have heretofore stated the general rule on this
point as it appears in 10 C. J. S., Bills and Notes, Page
630:
''If an agreement not to prosecute forms
any part of the consideration, it is immaterial
that there was an existing indebtedness. which
could have been a consideration for the instrument, as where the bill or note was given for
money embezzled or stolen by the maker."
See also 7 Am. J ur., Bills and Notes, Page 270, as
follows:
''Illegality of consideration for a bill or
note exists, and the instrument cannot be enforced, at least by one not a holder in due course,
where it is given to conceal, suppress, or compound a public offense, regardless of whether
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such offense was actually committed, even though
it is also given in settlement of a civil liability
from the same act that constitutes the offense,
for it is well settled that criminal process cannot he used to collect a private debt. Thus, a
bill or note given to repay embezzled money in
~consideration of an agreement, express or implied, to conceal the embezzlement, not to prosecute, or to stifle the prosecution is void."
We submit, accordingly, that the defense of illegal
consideration was established. The inducement of the
promise not to prosecute tainted the entire transaction
with illegality, and the fact that there existed what
might otherwise have been a valid consideration does
not remove the taint of illegality.
POINT IV
Plaintiff's fourth point is that there was insufficient evidence to go to the jury upon the question of
recovery hack of the $1,500 paid by defendant to plaintiff, and the $500 check delivered to plaintiff, and,
accordingly, its motion to dismiss defendant's counterclaim should have been granted.
Defendant's right to recover back such money and
such check stands upon exactly the same footing as his
liability under the note, for, as we have seen, property
obtained from another under duress may be recovered.
It remains only to be seen whether there was any substantial evidence of duress against defendant on the
part of plaintiff's agent Hagman in obtaining the $1,500
and the $500 check.
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We refer again to the fact that the delivery of this
money and check, as well as the signing of the note-, grew
out of the meeting of June 4 with Mr. Hagman, and at
which meeting, according to defendant's evidence, Hagman threatened criminal prosecution and imprisonment
of Frank if de-fendant didn't sign the note and pay the
$2,000. Certainly if the $1,500 and the $500 check had
been delivered to Hagman at that time- there would he
no doubt but that a case of duress had be-en made out.
Plaintiff contends, however, that as substantially a
month had elapsed since the threats no proof of duress
or coercion at the later date was shown.
In answer to this we go back to the fundamental
concept that if there were any facts shown from which
coercion on this later date might be inferred, it was for
the jury to determine.
As stated in 17 Am. J ur., Duress and Undue Influence, Page 906:
''Whether duress existed in the particular
transaction is usually a matter of fact.''
And in 11 C.J.S., Bills and Notes, Page 219:
''Duress is generally a question of fact for
the jury, as is also the question of continuance
of the duress at a time when a letter of defendant promising payment of the- previously executed notes was written, and where there is sufficient evidence in support of a defense of duress,
a direction of verdict for plaintiff is improper.''
The court in the case of Meyer v. Guardian Trust
Co. (C. C. A. 8th) 296 F. 789, states it thus:
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''It is quite apparent from the record that
in the admitted and offered testimony there was
evidence from which a jury could find that defendant in error assigned said notes because
of threats that his son would be prosecuted and
sent to the penitentiary for alleged forgery as
to the first notes given. Whether AngLis, the
party making such threats, was or was not the
agent of the defendant in error, is immaterial
on this branch of the case. If the mind and will
to contract of defendant in error was destroyed
by the threats, and if while in such condition he
signed the notes, then there was duress. Whether
or not such was the fact was a question to be
determined by a jury.''
We refer, accordingly, to the factual situation. On
June 4th Mr. Hagman made the threats. At that time
he had Frank's signed confession of guilt. Thus he
then not only made the threats of what would happen
to Frank if the note was not signed, and the money paid,
but he had the instrument in his possession (Frank's
confession) which made it possible for him to carry
his threats into fulfillment. The power of fulfillment
whicb he had on June 4th when the threats were made
he still held on June 6th when the note was signed,
and on July 4th when the $1,500 was paid and the $500
check delivered. He had stated once what would happen
if the note was not signed and the money paid - he
had the power to carry his threats into execution. It
was wholly unnecessary for him to repeat his threats.
Defendant had been once informed, and was not unmindful of the consequences.
Having onee made the threats, and having the
power to effect the consequenees, we submit that it
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was wholly a question for the jury as to whether the
note was signed, the money paid, and the check delivered
under duress, and the lower court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion to dismiss.
The threat here involved was not one of but passing moment, which disappeared upon removal from
the immediate presence of the person threating, as
might be in a case of threatened physical violence. Here
was a threat which constituted a continuing cloud- an
ever-present danger. It was as effective when defendant was in Ogden as when he was in Salt Lake. It was
as ever present on July 4th, as it was on June 6th, and
on June 4th, when the threats were first made.,
We do not quarrel with decisions reached by other
juries and other courts on other factual situations, as
reflected in cases cited by plaintiff. All we say is that
it was for this jury to decide, and this decision has
been made.
POINT V
Plaintiff's fifth point of argument is that the lower
court erred in submitting to the jury defendants' defense of illegal consideration under instructions (Instructions 1 and 6) which in effect told the jury that even
though they found that the note was not given under
duress, still if they found that the consideration therefor was a promise by plaintiff's agent that if the note
was signed by Mr. Berryessa Frank would not be criminally prosecuted, such consideration was illegal and
the note invalid as to the defendant W. S. Berryessa.
The instructions complained of are as follows :
''Instruction No. 1.
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You are instructed that the defendant, W.
S. Berryessa, admits signing the note sued upon
but raises two defenses to his liability thereon.
The first defense is that his signature was obtained as a result of the duress upon him of the
plaintiff's agent, J. G. Hagman, Jr., and that
but for such duress he would not have signed the
note. The duress as claimed by the defendant
consisted of threats by plaintiff's agent, J. G.
Hagman, Jr., that if the defendant, W. S. Berryessa, did not sign the note his son, Frank Berryessa, would be criminally prosecuted and sent
to jail. The second defense is that even if it
should be determined that such duress has not
been proven, nevertheless the only consideration for his signing the note was the promise
of plaintiff's agent, J. G. Hagman, Jr., that if
he would sign Frank Berryessa would not be
criminally prosecuted, and that sueh consideration is illegal and insuffieient to support the
note. You are instructed that either of these
defenses, if established by preponderance of the
evidence is a sufficient and adequate defense
to plaintiff's action against the defendant, W.
S. Berryessa. ''
''Instruction No. 6
You are instructed that the note sued upon by
the plaintiff is invalid against the defendant, W.
S. Berryessa, if not supported by a valuable
consideration. A promissory note given for the
suppression of a criminal prosecution is against
public policy and cannot be enforced between
the parties, and it is immaterial whether the
individual as to whom the criminal prosecution
is suppressed was guilty or innocent. Accordingly, if you believe from a preponderance of
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the evidence that the defendant, W. S. Berryessa, signed the note sued upon by the plaintiff
in consideration of plaintiff's promise through
its agent, J. G. Hagman, Jr., that Frank Berryessa would not be criminally prosecuted for his
defalcations, the note is invalid as to the defendant, W. S. Berryessa, and you must so find.
The burden of proof is on the defendant in
this case to prove that the consideration for which
the defendant signed the note was the suppression of a criminal prosecution against defendant's son.''
We do not understand that plaintiff contends that
that portion of such instructions as follows:
"You are instructed that the note sued upon
by the plaintiff is invalid against the defendant
W. S. Berryessa if not supported by a valuable
consideration. A promissory note given for the
suppression of a criminal prosecution is against
public policy and cannot be enforced between
the parties and it is immaterial whether the individual as to whom the criminal prosecution
is suppressed was guilty or innocent.''
incorrectly states the law, but rather, in plaintiff's
own words (page 25 of its brief):
''It gives the jury the idea that there are two
separate and distinct defenses to the validity of
the transaction: One, duress, and the other, failure of consideration, and the Court specifically
tells the jury that if either of these defenses is
established by a preponderance of the evidence,
the plaintiff cannot recover. In other words, the
Court, by this instruction and that portion of
Instruction No. 6 gives to the jury the idea that
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even though duress is not proven, yet the jury
may still bring in a verdict in favor of the defendant for want of consideration."
We submit that the issue of want of consideration,
as well as of duress, in the signing of the note was properly submitted to the jury. The defense of want of
consideration was specifically pleaded as a defense
(Paragraph 9 of Defendant's Answer, Tr. 005) and
there was evidence to support it.
In considering this phase of the matter it should
be borne in mind that defendant claims there were two
things done that induced him to sign the note. The
first is that plaintiff's agent threatened that if the
note was not signed, Frank would be criminally prosecuted. This is the duress. The second is that plaintiff's agent promised that if the note was signed Frank
would not be criminally prosecuted. This is the illegal
consideration. They are separte and distinct. The
jury might find that the threat was not made, in which
case the defense of duress was not sustained, but nevertheless find that the promise not to prosecute was made,
in which case the note is still invalid because of the
illegality of the consideration therefor.
We refer first to the only case cited by plaintiff
in support of its eontention of error on this point, Brane
v. First National Bank (Kan.) 20 P. (2) 506. This
case did not in anywise involve instructions or submission of defenses to the jury, but on the contrary
went up on demurrer and involved only the question
of whether the eomplaint stated a cause of action in
duress. The complaint alleged that defendant represented
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"that if the plaintiff would pay or secure said
defendant the sum of $4,000, that said defendant would accept same in full settlement of the
claim ag-ainst said son-in-law, and that the payment and security of the same would protect
said son-in-law from criminal prosecution.''
The court held that this did not state a cause of
action in duress, saying:
''Does this contain the threat necessary to constitute duress~ It contains no threat whatever,
unless the negative is to be inferred from the
last clause, that, if the payment and security are
not made and furnished, the son-in-law would
be prosecuted criminally. Inferences from facts
pleaded are not generally substitutes for necessary allegations.''
In the present case both the defense of duress and
of lack of consideration were pleaded, and evidence
offered on both. They were separate and distinct, and
each, in and of itself, sufficient. The pleading of these
separate defenses was proper under the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 8 (c) provides :
''(c) Affirmative Defense. In pleading to
a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth
affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory
negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality,
injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, resjudicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter
constituting an avoidance or a£firm)ltive defense". (italics added)
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Rule 8 (c) (2) provides:
"(2) A party may set forth two or more
statements of a claim or defense alternately or
hypotheticaily, either in one count or defense or
in separate counts or defenses. When two or
more statements are made in the alternative and
one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by
the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements. A party may also state as many
separate claims or defenses as he has regardless
of consistency and whether based on legal or
on equitable grounds or on both.''
As we have previously seen, if the promise not to
prosecute forms any part of the consideration it is
immaterial that there may be other consideration of
a legal nature. 10 C. J. S., Bills and Notes, Page 630:
"If an agreement not to prosecute criminally
forms any part of the consideration, it is immaterial that there was an existing indebtedness
which could have been a consideration for the
instrument, as where the bill or note was given
for money embezzled or stolen by the maker.''
Also Kirkland v. Benjamin (Ark.) 55 8. W. 840

Buck v. Paw Paw First National Bank (Mich.)
27 Mich. 293, 15 Am. Rep. 189
Swinburne v. Dahms (Ohio) 162 N. E. 776
Ogden v. Ford (Calif.) 176 P. 165.
The case of United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
v. Charles, et al, (Ala.) 31 So. 588, is on all fours factually with this case. We quote from the opinion:
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''The first and third pleas, to which demurrers were interposed by plaintiff and overruled
by the court, set up the illegality of the consideration of the notes sued on. These pleas aver
that the notes were given in consideration of an
agreement and promise made by the payee not
to prosecute the principal maker of said notes,
viz., one Caldwell, for the embezzlement by him
of $650 from the Standard Building & Loan Association of Montgomery, Ala., in the employment
of which company he was engaged as a bookkeeper. It is further shown by said pleas that
the payee guaranty company was security upon
the employment bond of said Caldwell at the time
of said embezzlement by him, and as such surety
paid to said building and loan association the
sum so embezzled. That there was an implied
contract, under the law, on the part of Caldwell,
to pay to the said guaranty company the amount
so paid by it to the building and loan association
for his said default, there can be no doubt, and
that upon such implied contract a right of action
existed and a recovery could be had by the guaranty company against said Caldwell is equally
clear, but that is not the contract here sued
upon. The contract sued upon is an express contract made by said Caldwell, together with the
defendants as his sureties, which is based upon
a consideration which is, at least in part, illegal.
It is contended by counsel for appellant that the
only difference between the contract implied by
law and the express contract sued upon is one of
evidence. In this contention appellant's counsel
is mistaken. The express contract, besides carrying with it the obligation of the defendants
as sureties, also provides for a waiver of exemptions, neither of which existed in the implied contract. The plaintiff, in his action, relies wholly
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upon the express eontract, and upon it he must
stand or fall, without any regard to the implied
contract which the law raised up between plaintiff and the principal debtor out of the circumstances of the default and embezzlement. It is
a well-settled principle of law that a consideration in part illegal will avoid the entire contract.
1 Brick. Dig. p. 382, Sec. 116, and cases there
cited. The fact that there was a contractual relation existing between Caldwell and the guaranty company, by virtue of the latter's suretyship upon a bond for the faithful performance
of duty by Caldwell to his employer, the Standard Building & Loan Association, cannot vary
the principle laid down in the authorities above
cited, or purge the contract of the illegality of
consideration. When the guaranty company paid
the amount of the default to the loan company,
it then occupied the same relation to the embezzler, as to an implied promise by him to refund,
as existed between the embezzler and the loan
company, from whom he embezzled the- funds,
before said guaranty company settled the defalcation. It is the promise, as an inducement to
the contract sued upon, that the payee will abstain
from criminal prosecution of the principal maker,
that taints the consideration of the note; being
opposed to public policy and offensive to the
law."
We submit, accordingly, that the lower court not
only did not err in submitting both of defendant's affirmative defenses to the jury, but it would have been error
for it not to have done so.
53 Am. Jur., Trial, Page 458:
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''A court instructing the jury may not ignore
or withdraw from the jury issues of fact which
are in the case and supported by evidence, a
ground of liability, or a proper defense."
And on page 460:
''Each party to an action is entitled to an
instruction upon his theory of the cases if there
is evidence to sustain it."
POINT VI
Plaintiff's sixth point is that the lower court erred
in refusing to give its requested instructions Nos. 1 and
2, which were in effect for a directed verdict. We have
heretofore demonstrated that there was competent evidence to the effect that the note was obtained as a consequence of the duress and illegal promise of the plaintiff's agent, Hagman, and the $1,500 payment made and
the $500 check given under the same circumstances.
This raised issues of fact, and their submission to the
jury was proper.
Plaintiff further contends that the court in giving
its Instruction No. 4, by which it defined duress, and
which was word-for-word plaintiff's definition of duress
as submited in its Request No. 3, it erred in om.ijtting
the purely gratuitous observation requested by plaintiff as follows:
''Duress will not ordinarily invalidate a promissory note entered into after opportunity for
deliberate action".
The court not only did not err in leaving that statement out of its instructions, but we submit it would have
been error to have included it. The question was whether
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duress as defined by the court was operating upon
the defendant at the time the note was signed and the
payment made. That question the jury had to determine. For the court to suggest to the jury by this statement that duress was not here present would have constituted an usarpation of the jury's province, and been
error. Wbether duress "ordinarily" will or will not
invalidate a note entered into after an opportunity for
deliberation is purely argumentative, and it is fundamental that argument has no place in an instruction.
53 Am. J ur ., Trial, Page 439 :

''Argument, which lies properly within the
domain of counsel in the case, finds no place in
instructions of the court. A court should not give,
and may properly refuse, argumentative instructions.''
Plaintiff also contends that the lower court erred
in refusing to give its Requested Instruction No. 6, although conceding that is was partially covered by the
court's instruction No. 5. The court's instruction No.
5 is as follows :
"No. 5.
You are further instructed that even though
you should believe, by a preponderance of the
evidence in this case, that at some time previous
to the execution of the promissory note, the payment of one thousand five hundred ($1,500.00)
dollars, and the giving of the personal check for
five hundred ($500.00) Dollars, the said Hagman
did make threats to initiate criminal prosecution of defendant's son and that the same constituted duress as that term bas been heretofore
defined, yet you must find for, the plaintiff in
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this case unless you further believe, by preponderance of the evidence, that said duress, if you
should find as a fact that there was duress, existed
and continued to exist over the mind of the defendant at the time he actually signed the said
note and the time he paid the one thousand five
hundred ($1,500.00) dollars, and the giving of
the check for five hundred ($500.00) dollars.''
By this instruction the court clearly and with certainly advised the jury that the defendant could recover
his $1,500 and $500 check only by proving hy a preponderance of the evidence that the same was paid and delivered over under duress then present and operative.
Having so stated it in the affirmative, we do not conceive it to be error for the court to have omitted to state
the same principle in the negative, which is all plaintiff's Request No. 6 called for in addition to that given.
As stated in 53 Am. Jur., Trial, Page 444:
''Instructions should not he repeated, since
the tendency is to mislead and confuse the jury
by placing undue emphasis on particular points,
but a violation of the rule is not reversible error
unless it reasonbly appears that the jury was
misled. Statements of law should not be given
undue prominence by repetition or otherwise.''
Plaintiff further contends that the lower court erred
in refusing to give its Request No. 7 to the effect that
''if you should further find from the evidence in
this case that the defendant W. S. Berryessa
thereafter, and after any threat of duress had
been removed, voluntarily made a payment of
$50.00 on said obligation, then I instruct you that
such payment, if freely and voluntarily made,
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would constitute a waiver of his defense of duress and your verdict should be in favor of the
plaintiff.''
The principle of law thus offered to the court is to
the effect that the subsequent $50.00 payment, if voluntarily made, would not only in and of itself not be recoverable, but would validate the entire transaction, that
is, the signing of the note, the paying of the $1,500, and
the delivery of the check. Insofar as recovery of the
$50.00 itself is involved, we are not here concerned with
it, because the court did not submit it to the jury, and
the defendant lost as to it. As to the proposition that
the $50.00 payment, if voluntarily made, would validate
the remaining transactions consummated under duress,
we submit that such is not the law and the requested
instruction is bad. It should he horne in mind that
there were really two tranactions, although all growing out of the June 4th meeting, namely, the signing of
the note for $4,865.20, and the later payment of $1,500
and the delivery of the $500 check, which were not on
account of the note, but over and above the amount
thereof. Assuming that the note was signed, the $1,500
was paid, and the check delivered, all under duress, a
subsequent voluntary payment on the note could not
under any circustances he deemed a waiver of the duress
insofar as the $1,500 and the check is concerned. This
in and of itself rendered the instruction bad in toto.
An equally fundamental reason why the request
states bad law, is that it is predicated upon the assumption that the note, if obtained by the duress or upon the
consideration claimed by defendant, is merely voidable,
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and thus subject to validation through subsequent conduct by the defendant that would constitute a waiver
of the defense.
We do not dispute that contracts obtained under
certain types of duress, or upon certain illegal considerations may be only Yoidable, but such is not the case
where the duress is the threat of a criminal prosecution, or the consideration the suppression of a crime
through a promise not to. prosecute. Under those circumstances the contract is void, not voidable, because
contrary to public policy, and thus cannot be ratified
through subsequent conduct.
7 Am. J ur., Bills and Notes, Page 968:
''Thus a bill or note given to repay embezzled
money in consideration of an agreement, express
or implied, to conceal the emb€zzlement, not to
prosecute, or to stifle the prosecution is void.''
10 C. J. S., Bills and Notes, Page 628 :
''As between the immediate parties or their
privies, a bill or note founded upon an illegal
consideration * * * is void and unenforceable.''
and at Page 630:
''Bills and notes for the concealment of a
crime or the suppression or hindering of a criminal prosecution are against public policy and
cannot be enforced between the immediate parties,
whether the maker was innocent or guilty.''

Henry v. State Bank of Laurens (Ia.) 107 N. W. 1034:
''Moreover, if the note and deed were void
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because contrary to public policy, their delivery
even without duress would not make them valid.
This is hornbook law requiring no citation of
authorities in its support.''

POINT VII
Plaintiff's final point is that the lower court erred
in denying plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. This, we feel, has been fully and
completely covered elsewhere in this brief, and the lower
court did not err in this regard.

CONCLUSIOIN
For the reasons hereinabove set out, it is submitted
that the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

HOWEL·L, STINE AND OLMSTEAD
Attorneys for Defendant,
W. S. Berryessa
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